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## HOW TO LOSE A WAR

by Edna Lonigan

The idea is firmly implanted in the public mind today that, to win a modern war, it is somehow necessary to mobilize all the manpower and the resources of the nation, putting labor, industry, farming, and even our intellectual life, under militarized central control, like that of the armed forces -- what is currently described as "total mobilization".

Taft and other Congressional leaders of both parties have said they would go slow in giving the President war powers over civilian life. But they rest their case on the hope that we are only partly involved in Korea. Thus they concede that, if the war should spread, there is no alternative to accepting militarization of all national life.

A great many Americans believe that victory in war, if it must be achieved by total conscription (with its inevitable dictatorship) will be hardly worth fighting for. The danger of all-pervading despair is real. From the purely psychological point of view, therefore, total mobilization is a dubious step. But there are more general objections.

It is too generally assumed that militarization of civilian life follows military developments which were inevitable because of the new technology, and that political totalitarianism ensued. The exact reverse is the truth. The political climate changed first, and political leaders remade the pattern of war in their image. When leaders possess total power, their war aims become more and more expansive. They mobilize more segments of national life and force them to greater efforts to win more fantastic ends.

Of course these political changes happen more easily in the crisis atmosphere of wartime. But the impulsion to make them does not spring from the problems of the new technology. It is to be found in the political shift from limited to total power.

Opponents of political totalitarianism will be impotent so long as they accept the fallacy that over-all mobilization is the only way to fight a war in the age of technology. Modern totalitarianism is weak, not strong; it is the product not of growth, but of decay.

The truth of the matter is that the "war economy" with its identical twin, thought control, is probably the best way to lose a war. Survival of the United States in the war in which we are now enmeshed, will depend on our ability to withstand the siren song of those who plead for total mobilization; for "standing by the President".

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## II

Just as the alternative to total government is limited government, so the alternative to total war is limited war. In limited war, the government of limited powers must set limited objectives, and so the military, whose means are always limited in fact, have a far better chance to win the war.

The idea of limited war lies deep in Christian ethics. The medieval Church strove in every way to limit the impact of war, and to surround it by restraints that would reduce its destructive power. When the Christian world divided, the humanists tried to limit war by the development of law, and far-sighted rulers had by Marlborough's time imposed restraints on fighting as formal as the rules of chess.

The French Revolution brought the turn to total war. When the badly defeated revolutionary government decided to draft all the manpower of France, war ceased to be limited and professional. This fatal step reversed the direction of our ideas, and reached its logical end in the totalitarian State, or militarization of all elements of modern life.

Mobilization spread in ever-widening circles to all sectors of national life. Prussia extended military conscription to peacetime, and made it permanent. Then Hindenburg's staff worked out the total conscription of production, manpower and scientific knowledge, in 1918. Next, the men who had been trained in Hindenburg's War Socialism, like Walter Rathenau and Wichard von Moellendorf, carried the idea onward, to make the "planned economy", or total mobilization in peacetime.

Hitler, studying the weaknesses of the Welfare State, worked out the last link, the technique for conscription of the mind, by which the masses could be made a base completely servile to the new Nazi elite.

It is curious how few people ask the $64 question: Do the nations which adopt total mobilization actually win their wars? Germany, the greatest exponent of total mobilization, lost its last two wars. The gradual spread of total mobilization all over the Western world has had truly disastrous results. Wars have become more brutal; war objectives more manic; fruits of victory more infinitesimal. The periods between open wars have grown shorter, and the descent to barbarism has gained increasing speed.

## III

The idea of total war spreads, not because it is efficient, but because it trains a body of men who like "planning" and control over other men. War gives them a vast propaganda apparatus by which to tell people that they, like Chantecler, cause the sun to rise.

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The germs of conscription were planted here in the United States in 1918 when we trained a body of young men in habits of "planning" and control. Then Bernard Baruch, one of the "young men", wrote down the scheme for immediate total mobilization of this country in the event of another war. Between the wars inertia preserved the ingrained American hatred of regimentation. But there was no active rebuttal of the new ideas, and the seeds grew.

When the Second World War was over, the American people had the energy for only a limited and shallow civil demobilization. Finance was kept under war controls. Industry was kept in near-mobilization by orders for defense and foreign aid. The supervising staff for national mobilization was kept intact in spite of Senator Byrd's valiant efforts to demobilize it. Most important, the party in power kept its dominance over public opinion. By the lightest of pressures the Opposition was slowly choked, so that it could not crystallize its emerging ideas into dangerous thoughts.

The managers of "Planwirtschaft" dress their demands for total power to meet changes in fashions. Our Moellendorfs and Rathenaus in the President's Council of Economic Advisers, and other high places, have worked out blueprints for permanent management of all national life by the State. If we have unemployment, they call the plan "full employment". If we have prosperity, they call it "Point Four". In wartime they call it "The Defense Production Act of 1950 - H.R. 9176". The plans are fundamentally all the same. They are essential steps in the winning of power. They are not essential steps in the winning of a war.

Total mobilization in the past has had one brief advantage. It skimmed the cream of past creative free effort. Coming after a hundred years of industrial progress, it could appear successful in 1918. The Americans refilled the creative reservoir between the two wars and won the last conflict.

If we have any idea that this may be a long war, we dare not yield to the President's demand for creeping total conscription of all national life. We did not, as we said earlier, return to full creative free enterprise after 1945. We did not refill our reservoirs as we did after 1918. We cannot be certain of winning the last battle this time. Our margin is so narrow today that total mobilization, under the suffocating rule of the planners, could mean defeat.

## IV

The big fallacy in total war is that we trust the chiefs of state to be infallible at the moment when their judgment is most fallible -- when the Opposition is no longer permitted to point out their mistakes.

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In peacetime, men at the center of government beehive offices do not make better decisions than the rest of us. Under total mobilization, these bureaucrats are even less likely to be right. Those who disagree with the chief are labelled as traitors, trying to lose the war. Thus the higher ranks are filled by timid men who say "Yes", trimmers, "Vicars of Bray", who work to build up the party so they can remain in power, and cold, clever men who deceive the chief while they build the power of their own faction.

When there is no strong Opposition outside the party in power -- not dependent upon it and not afraid of it -- there is no way to protect decent men inside the government whose objective is to serve their country, not to build a political machine. MacArthur and other patriotic military men cannot make the military decisions, and protect themselves against the State Department, without a vigorous Opposition, able to tell their story to the country.

In wartime we need moral unity for one purpose -- to win the war. Far from needing unity of ideas, we need competition of ideas. In the trial before us, we need a strong Opposition party. We need also a strong independent Congress. On the economic front, we need all the free energy of farmers, industry, labor, instead of government propaganda, forced saving, manpower and price controls.

What of inflation? The greatest inflation today is in government. If we take the inflation out of government we can lay the specter of inflation for a long time to come. For example, the release of government stocks of butter and cotton ought to precede the two-edged weapon of price controls. The short supply of steel could be relieved by full production in Germany. If we lay the myth that civil mobilization is a magic remedy we can deal with specific problems one by one.

Instead of total mobilization, we must be guided by the concept of limited war. We must take up again this idea of Christianity, of the humanists, of the great political theorists of the West.

It requires far more intelligence to manage limited war than total war. This offers a far more inspiring challenge to our abilities than the strait jacket of total mobilization.

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Not Merely Gossip *A Supplement to* Human Events Vol. VII, No. 30

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By Frank C. Hanighen July 26, 1950

THE BIG DECISION: There is one $64 question which is increasingly asked: Who was responsible for the U.S. decision to intervene in Korea? Some pro-Government columnists have sought to pin the responsibility on the chiefs of staff, or on MacArthur; and it would be surprising if this version had not been inspired by the State Department officials. Like many others in the press, we tried during the first few weeks of the war, but vainly, to get the Defense chiefs' story. They and their aides, we learned, had received orders not to discuss the matter, and were strictly observing those orders. In the past week, however, either the rule has been relaxed, or high military men have decided to overlook it. And so "leaks" are appearing. We give you as much of the story as we have been able to obtain:

Neither MacArthur, nor the military chiefs in the Capital recommended the intervention. Either at the Sunday, June 25, conference in the Blair House, or the crucial conference the next day, the military men opposed -- although mildly -- the idea of going into the Korean peninsula. But it is certain that it was at the Monday conference that the military received, without any prior notice, the President's announcement of his decision to intervene, and his orders "to get going". Our informants understand that the step of intervention was recommended to the President by Secretary Dean Acheson.

As to the question of whether or not General MacArthur was consulted before the final decision was made -- we have not been able to secure any definite answer. Despite extensive canvassing, the response to queries was "we do not know and can't find out". However, it is doubted for several reasons that, if consulted, the Far East commander approved of the intervention. For one thing, it is known that MacArthur, a few days after Truman's announcement of intervention, on his return to Tokyo from his short trip to the front lines, used such language in one dispatch as to indicate that he had not approved. Next, former members of his wartime staff (now in Washington) say that MacArthur in 1945 expressed the opinion in no uncertain terms that Korea would be untenable if the Red Army wanted to take it.

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CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: Last week, we suggested that this year's Congressional elections might parallel those of 1942, when the GOP registered big gains and almost took the House. It is significant that this parallel is being examined closely now by political observers, one of whom -- the veteran Gould Lincoln, of the Star -- discussed it a few days ago in his column. Democratic confidence, pronounced in the first week of the war, is waning, and Republican hopes are rising. The President's speech of last week, and his wartime control recommendations, have done his popularity no good; letters to the local papers indicate great dissatisfaction with him and his program.

Also, privately conducted polls raise the spirits of the GOP. One of these, sampled in Pennsylvania, Maryland and Connecticut, assayed the chances of incumbent Democratic Senators, as follows: (1) Myers (Pa.) -- "bad"; Tydings (Md.) -- "not good"; McMahon (Conn.) -- "more opposition developing". In the Capital, one hears many reports from the neighboring state of Maryland; and an observation frequently made is that Tydings' conduct of the McCarthy charges is a liability to him. The Senators' greatest asset, it is pointed out, was his independence of the Executive. Now many in the Free State regard him as a "pawn of the White House".

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On the other hand, much depends on how the GOP fights in November. Tydings may be weak, but Maryland observers do not believe his Republican opponent will be a good vote-getter and foresee inadequate funds in the Party chest. Some leaders of the GOP are again, as in 1942, talking the line that it would be a bad thing to capture one or both Houses of Congress. The National Committee spent very little that year; and many Republicans have claimed that the GOP could have won the House in '42 if strong support had been given to the candidates. There may possibly be an anti-Administration ground swell this year, but it is questionable whether the Opposition will take advantage of it.

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GOP LEFT WING: On July 13, just three days before the Tydings committee's whitewash report on the McCarthy charges was referred to the Senate, the Saturday Evening Post offered some sharp editorial comment on the Senate Republican bleeding hearts: "Some people are still ecstatic about the performance of the seven restive Republican Senators headed by Senator Margaret Smith of Maine, who last month issued a declaration about the evils of 'smear tactics' in the course of Congressional investigations. . . . The joy in the Truman coterie over the performance of the seven Republicans that repented should have been the tip-off to the Smith-Morse-Ives-Tobey-Aiken-Hendrickson group, known in coarse circles as the Soft Underbelly of the Republican Party. . . . If the seven sensitive Senators want something to get mad about, why not work on the Administration's refusal to produce the information which alone can make it possible to tell whether McCarthy is practicing 'McCarthyism' or really has something."

Needless to say, such was not the line taken by columnist Doris Fleeson, the Administration's intellectual sob sister, who has been massaging Mrs. Smith for months. Discussing this Senate battle over Communism in the State Department, that columnist said (July 19): "There are no victors. Perhaps the closest anyone came to a profit is Senator Margaret Chase Smith of Maine, whose courageous Declaration of Conscience earned her new admirers and attractive publicity." Observers here wonder whether the "profit" Miss Fleeson speaks about was Truman's appointment of Mrs. Smith as a delegate to UNESCO.

On the other hand, it should be noted that the "seven" lined up faithfully with the rest of the Republican Senators to vote against the Tydings "whitewash" report on the McCarthy charges -- a remarkable demonstration of Party regularity. Observers believe that in large part this solidarity sprang from the knowledge that McCarthy's charges were believed and approved by the home folks. This Republican "closing of the ranks" has several diverse results. Fair Deal columnists mourn that their favorites among the GOP chose Party regularity over "liberalism". Hasn't it been evident for some days that Senator Ives, for instance, usually the recipient of approving smiles from his Democratic press admirers, is not receiving the benediction of "liberal"? The answer is that the New York Senator is now thoroughly aroused about the subversives in Government and makes no bones about it, either in his speeches or in chats with correspondents in the lobbies.

But the maneuvers to get Republicans in the Cabinet go on, and some Republicans are actively working to get asked. For instance, we note that the unforgettable Robert P. Patterson, former Secretary of War and now President of Freedom House, announced on July 18 that the 1950 Freedom Award would go to Secretary Acheson for his "valiant and constructive voice leading the Democratic world toward unity against tyranny". Patterson -- like Acheson, a strong believer in Alger Hiss -- is said to hanker to return bipartisanly as Secretary of War and we note that Republican Advance, Russell Davenport's Fair Deal Republicans for Democratic Action, while pledging (on July 19) "our support to our President, Harry S. Truman . . ." on the Korean war, also demanded that Secretary of War Louis Johnson must go.

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JOURNALISM IN WASHINGTON: For superlative gall, we tip our hat to the Washington Post for its July 20 editorial on Henry Wallace's scuttle to cover over the Korean war. Said Wallace: "When my country is at war and the United Nations sanctions that war, I am on the side of my country and the United Nations." Said the Post: "No doubt many less conspicuous fellow travellers reacted in much the same way; by now the ranks of the followers, said by J. Edgar Hoover to number half a million, are probably very much thinner. Love of country often exerts a far stronger pull than ideology, however doctrinaire!" The Post's record of hollering "witch hunt" every time a determined effort is made to get the fellow travellers out of government is notorious. It has blackguarded the House Un-American Activities Committee without mercy. It has always struck us as peculiar that the most vociferous internationalists -- and the Post is one -- who never tire of insisting about how small the world is now in this day of fast communication, and how grave our Point Four responsibilities are, and how admirably Secretary Acheson faces the Soviet dragon, are the very ones who show scant concern over domestic subversion.

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REVISIONIST LITERATURE: Harry Elmer Barnes' pamphlet, Rauch on Roosevelt: A Study in Appearances and Realities, has just come in. Twenty pages are devoted to an examination of Basil Rauch's Roosevelt from Munich to Pearl Harbor. (Reviewed in HUMAN EVENTS, July 21, 1950.) Dr. Barnes, in his dissection of the work, produces this interesting chapter from Rauch's scholastic past:

"Professor Rauch's one previous excursion into diplomatic history was his doctoral dissertation, American Interest in Cuba, 1848-1855, prepared in the seminar of Professor Allan Nevins at Columbia University. The editor of the American Historical Review sent the book for review to a distinguished Cuban historian, Professor Hermino Portell Vila. The review, published in . . . October, 1948, was one of the most devastating ever printed in this journal since its origin. . . . Professor Portell Vila points out that Mr. Rauch did not have any decent command of the Spanish language, indispensable for the execution of such a project; often could not even spell the names of the Cuban authorities he used or the Cuban personalities he mentioned; was guilty of 'historical inaccuracies and outright misleading assertions'; appeared to have no better knowledge of Cuban geography than of the Spanish language; and even quoted Professor Portell Vila to support untenable assertions." Dr. Barnes gives a decidedly negative view of Rauch's current study of Roosevelt's foreign policy.

The author of the pamphlet also laments the lack of critical examination, among American educators, of the Roosevelt foreign policy, and the general submissiveness of the public under the rain of government propaganda. "In Communist Russia and Nazi Germany", he remarks, ". . . the tyrannical rulers found it necessary to suppress all opposition thought in order to induce the majority of the people to accept the material fed them by official propaganda. But, in the United States, with almost complete freedom of the press, speech and information, down to the end of 1941, great numbers of Americans followed the official propaganda line with no compulsion whatever. This is a remarkable and ominous contrast -- especially significant because it has been the 'educated' element which has been the most gullible, taking the population as a whole. And the situation has continued since 1945, though of course the public has been less able to get the truth from the avenues of information since VJ Day than was the case before Pearl Harbor."

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NOTICE TO READERS: Dr. Barnes has sent us a small quantity of copies of his pamphlet for distribution. We are prepared to send one copy free to every subscriber who applies -- as long as the copies last.

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# Book Events

This is Germany: edited by Arthur Settel. New York: William Sloane Associates. $4.00. Reviewed by W. H. Chamberlin.

This is post-war Germany as seen through the eyes of a score of American and British newspapermen. The editor is a public relations official in the office of the American High Commissioner. The book reflects the usual advantages and disadvantages of the symposium approach to a subject.

Germany is not an easy country to cover, if only because of its division into four zones of Occupation. Twenty pairs of eyes might reasonably be expected to see more than one. The reader gets the benefit of a variety of judgments.

On the other hand there is inevitably some duplication. As in any group of newspapermen, there is a wide range of background knowledge, intelligent appraisal of what has been observed and general competence. One wishes that some of the abler contributions could have been longer, while others, which represent little but a rehash of wartime prejudices and clichés, could well have been omitted.

First prize in this journalistic competition should go to Richard Lowenthal for his essay on "The Germans in the Cold War". A German by birth and education, Mr. Lowenthal returned to Germany as a naturalized Briton and correspondent of a British publication. His advantages in firsthand knowledge of Germany are obvious. And he avoids very successfully the two opposite weaknesses which sometimes affect the judgment of a former political refugee. He writes without sentimentality and also without bitterness.

German political currents are described, the German parties are analyzed, the German attitudes toward the cold war are set forth with precision and authority. There is perhaps a slight bias in favor of the Social Democrats. Nevertheless Mr. Lowenthal has written just the kind of intelligent appraisal of German political conditions which ought to appear in our magazines and newspaper supplements, but rarely does.

His conclusions seem to keep up with the headlines. There is, he thinks, no serious political attraction by the East and Russia is growing more, rather than less, committed to the Oder-Neisse line. And he gets to the heart of the weakness of Western policy in Germany when he suggests that "practical proof must be given of Allied willingness to treat the defeated and occupied country in current economic and political issues not merely as an object of Allied solicitude, but as a genuine partner".

James O'Donnell, in a contribution that seems too short for the development of an interesting idea, explains the psychological bases of Franco-German rapprochement. Both countries were defeated in the late war; neither is a Great Power; intelligent Frenchmen and Germans realize that they are pawns between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Marguerite Higgins, recently transferred by the Herald-Tribune to the Far East, describes how East and West came to the parting of the ways in Berlin. Kathleen McLaughlin, of the New York Times, traces the Constitutional discussions which led to the establishment of the Bonn regime. Joseph Evans, of the Wall Street Journal, analyzes the futility of the attempt to collect reparations and reaches the conclusion that reparations cannot be extracted from a defeated nation unless the victors are willing to destroy the nation and the people in it or to rebuild the nation so that it can pay reparations.

Some of the contributions describe everyday life. The weakest chapters are those on war trials and education. These are permeated with a superficial spirit of smug self-righteousness and the discussion of education makes the questionable assumption that American education in all respects is superior to German.



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